Noteworthy: Rules, discretion, and the future of the Fed by Jeff Lacker
T
his issue of Region Focus
appears as the Federal
Reserve System wel-
comes a new chairman. On
February 1, Ben Bernanke
became only the 14th person to
hold that position in the institu-
tion’s 92-year history. The
transition presents an opportu-
nity to look back on the notable
success that the Fed has enjoyed
under outgoing Chairman Alan
Greenspan, and to think about
the future of monetary policy.
The Fed’s effectiveness in securing price stability over the
past 25 years has been unmistakable. Greenspan’s predeces-
sor, Paul Volcker, took a series of bold steps to bring down
inflation from double-digit levels. And since the late 1980s,
early in Greenspan’s tenure, inflation, as measured by the
Consumer Price Index, has dropped from an average of
more than 4.5 percent to about 2.5 percent in recent years.
Just as important, inflation expectations also have become
more stable. Keeping inflation contained over these last two
decades is a remarkable accomplishment. And this low infla-
tion did not come at the cost of real economic growth.
During this period, the U.S. economy experienced the
longest expansion since World War II, bookended by two
brief, mild recessions.
Some observers have identified “flexibility” as the key to
Fed policy under Greenspan. By this, they mean an approach
to policy that is not excessively tied to any one doctrine. They
contrast this trait with an approach to policy that follows a
rigid rule — perhaps such as a numerical inflation target — and
suggest that the success of the last 18 years demonstrates the
virtues of discretionary rather than rules-based monetary
policy. This distinction goes back 30 years to a paper which
argued the opposite, that rules were better than discretion.
That paper was written by Finn E. Kydland and Edward C.
Prescott, who won the 2004 Nobel Prize for economics.
So does the success of apparently discretionary policy in
the Greenspan era prove Kydland and Prescott wrong? No.
It strikes me that those who see recent policy as evidence for
discretion over rules are using the terms differently than
originally intended.
The Kydland and Prescott analysis showed that a central
bank taking a discretionary approach may be sometimes
tempted to ease policy to boost employment and output,
despite the risk of higher inflation. The anticipation that
policymakers will behave this way in the future will drive up
current inflation. The result is likely to be persistently high
and ever-rising inflation, with no substantial benefit for
growth and employment.
To get around this problem, Kydland and Prescott said
that policymakers would do better if they could “commit” to
a pattern of behavior that avoids the temptation to ease 
policy at the expense of inflation. To work, this commitment
has to be believable, or “credible.” A rules-based policy
involves any tool that allows the policymaker to credibly
commit not to succumb to temptation. One way to achieve
credibility is to adopt an inflation target. But this is not the
only way. What is essential is a consistent pattern of behav-
ior that the public understands and believes will dictate the
central bank’s future behavior.
So has the Greenspan Fed been discretionary or rules-
based? The flexibility that many people emphasize points to
discretion. But I think a careful examination suggests that
Fed behavior in recent decades has been closer to what
Kydland and Prescott would describe as adhering to rules.
This is evident first and foremost in the clear and persistent
articulation of a focus on price stability that has come
through Greenspan’s testimony before Congress and other
official communications. Rule-like behavior is also apparent
in the attention the Fed has paid to the public’s expecta-
tions. Most notably, the Fed’s move to greater transparency
in the last 10 years or so has enabled it to craft Federal Open
Market Committee statements that to some extent guide
the public’s expectations about future policy. This sort of
attention to expectations can be every bit as constraining on
policymakers as the announcement of and adherence to a
narrowly defined rule for setting interest rates.
To my mind, building monetary policy credibility has
been the true hallmark of the Federal Reserve under
Greenspan’s leadership. Maintaining such robust credibility
will take continual vigilance. Key to this will be helping the
public understand that we intend to respond to future con-
ditions in a way that keeps inflation low and stable.
Eventually, this may entail adopting a numerical inflation
target or some other more formal, rules-based system. We
have Greenspan’s stewardship to thank for getting us to this
point. Far from being “flexible,” the Greenspan Fed gave up
the flexibility to let inflation get out of control. Instead, it
established credibility for our commitment to price stability.
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